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Non-Waiver of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Residential Leases
KATHERYN M. DUTENHAVER*
INTRODUCTION
"TENANT AGREES THAT NO REPRESENTATIONS, WAR-
RANTIES (EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED) OR COVENANTS
WITH RESPECT TO THE CONDITION, MAINTENANCE OR
IMPROVEMENTS OF THE APARTMENT, BUILDING, OR
OTHER AREAS HAVE BEEN MADE TO TENANT EXCEPT
THOSE CONTAINED IN THIS LEASE, THE APPLICATION,
OR OTHERWISE IN WRITING SIGNED BY THE LESSOR."'
Under common law principles, a landlord had no duty to place
or maintain premises in a habitable condition. As transferee of a
less-than-freehold estate, a tenant was treated as an owner and was
given the rights and duties of ownership for the agreed upon term:
the right of exclusive possession and the concomitant duties to pay
rent and not to commit waste.' The transfer was considered a con-
veyance of land and the property principle of caveat emptor was
applicable. A tenant had to rely on his own inspection and his own
judgement. There were no implied warranties relating to the condi-
tion of the premises. The only covenant implied by operation of law
to the landlord was that of quiet enjoyment. Once the right to pos-
session was delivered, a landlord had fully performed all legal obli-
gations, and the only continuing duty was to refrain from interfering
with the tenants peaceable enjoyment of the premises.3
Thirty-seven jurisdictions have now departed from the common
law interpretation of the landlord-tenant relationship and have dis-
carded to a considerable extent the application of the doctrine
caveat emptor.' This departure has taken various forms. Twenty-
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, De Paul University, B.A., North Central
College, 1960; J.D., De Paul University, 1972.
1. Chicago Real Estate Board, Apartment Lease No. 15 § 6A (1974).
2. A tenant could not use the premises so as to substantially injure the reversion. A
violation of this duty was considered waste. 1 AMmuCAN LAw OF PRoPmRY § 3.39 (A.J. Casner
ed. 1952). See Turman v. Safeway Stores, 132 Mont. 273, 279, 317 P.2d 302, 306 (1957).
3. See Harms v. McCormick, 132 Ill. 104, 22 N.E. 511 (1889); 1 AMmuCAN LAW OF PRoPErrY
§ 3.47 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law 255 (2d ed. 1937). But
see Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance?-A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. URB.
L. 649 (1975).
4. These jurisdictions are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District
of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
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two states have enacted legislation which places some duty on a
landlord for the condition of the premises rented for residential
purposes.5 Of these states, half have adopted the applicable provi-
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin. See notes
5-8 infra and accompanying text.
The common law doctrine of caveat emptor is still adhered to in Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and Wyoming. Application of this doctrine permits the tenant
to inspect the premises and determine for himself their suitability with the option of securing
an express warranty from the landlord. 1 AMEmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.45 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952).
Nevertheless, in Pennyslvania the Common Plea Court implied a warranty of habitability
setting the provisions of the applicable housing code as the minimum standard of landlord's
responsibility. Dern v. Cangemi, 43 U.S.L.W. 2020 (Phila. Ct. C. P. July 16, 1974). The
decision in this lower court case might be an indication that Pennsylvania is moving in the
direction of implying the warranty of habitability. See also Comment, Implied Warranty of
Habitability in Pennsylvania, 15 DuQuxsN L. Rav. 459 (1977).
In ten of the states which still adhere to the doctrine of caveat emptor-Alabama, Arkan-
ass, Idaho, Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming-the issue of whether to discard the doctrine has not been before the courts. Nonethe-
less, Nevada, without any judicial decisions on the issue, may have indicated its rejection of
the doctrine by enacting legislation in January of 1976 which requires any written rental
contract or lease to contain a provision relating to the respective responsibilities of the land-
lord and the tenant as to any damage or repair to the apartment or any of its furnishings.
Only three states, Colorado, North Carolina and Texas have specifically rejected a move
toward changes in existing landlord-tenant law. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Del Bosco, 35 Colo.
App. 399, 536 P.2d 838 (1975), affd, 558 P.2d 563 (1976); Knuckles v. Spaugh, 26 N.C. App.
340, 215 S.E.2d 825 (1975); Kamarath v. Bennett, 549 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
5. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.010-.380 (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. §§ 33-1301 to 1381 (1974);
CONN. GIN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 25, §§ 5101 to 6504 (1975); GA.
CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 83.40-.63 (West Supp. 1978); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 383.505-.715 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1976); LA. Civ. CODE ANN, arts. 2692 to 2744 (West
1952); ME. Rzv. STAT. tit. 14, § 6021 (Cum. Supp. 1978-79); MD. CODE ANN. R.P. 68-211 (1977
Supp.); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 554.139 (Supp. 1978-79); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504.18 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 42-202 (1961); NED. REv. STAT. §§ 76-1401 to
-1449 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-7-1 to -51 (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 47-16-13 (Supp. 1977); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, §§ 31-32 (West 1954); ORE. Rav. STAT. §§
91.700-.865 (1977); R.I. GEN LAws § 34-18-16 (1969); S.D. COMPiLED LAws ANN. § 43-32-8
(Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-2801 to -2864 (1976); VA. CODE §§ 55-248.2-.40 (Cum.
Supp. 1978).
Some states require the landlord to initially turn over and thereafter keep the premises in
repair. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-13.1-.2 (1977). A similar provision appears in OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 31 (West 1954). See also GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1966): "The landlord
must keep the premises in repair, and shall be liable for all substantial improvements placed
upon them by his consent." In Louisiana, "The lessor is bound from the very nature of the
contract . . . to maintain the thing [leased] in a condition such as to serve for the use for
which it is hired." A. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2692 (West 1952). Compare MD. CODE ANN. R.P.
§ 8-211(a) (Supp. 1978):
The purpose of the section is to provide tenants with a mechanism for encouraging
the repair of serious and dangerous defects which exist within or as part of any
residential dwelling unit, or upon the property used in common of which the dwell-
ing unit forms a part. The defects sought to be reached by this section are those
which present a substantial and serious threat of danger to the life, health and
1978] Warranty of Habitability
sions of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
("ULRTA").1 Other jurisdictions have judicially implied warranties
safety of the occupants of the dwelling unit, and not those which merely impair the
aesthetic value of the premises, or which are, in those locations governed by such
codes, housing code violations of a nondangerous nature.
and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (2)(a) (West Supp. 1978):
Unless the repair was made neceassary by the negligence or improper use of the
premises by the tenant, the landlord is under duty to:
1. Keep in reasonable state of repair portions of the premises over which
he maintains control;
2. Keep in a reasonable state of repair all equipment under his control
necessary to supply services which he has expressly or impliedly agreed to
furnish to the tenant, such as heat, water, elevator or air conditioning;
3. Make all necessary structural repairs;
4. Repair or replace any plumbing, electrical wiring, machinery or equip-
ment furnished with the premises and no longer in reasonable working condi-
tion ....
Other states require the landlord to meet the standard set by housing codes. See MAs. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 111, § 127L (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1978); MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 554.139 (Supp.
1977-78): R.I. GEN. LAws § 34-18-16 (1969).
Still others require the landlord to meet a more general standard such as complying with
a warranty that a dwelling is fit for human habitation. See, e.g., ME. REy. STAT. tit. 14, §
6021 (Cum. Supp. 1978-79).
6. URLTA was prepared in 1972 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form States Laws. See ALASKA STAT. 99 34.03.010-.380 (1975); ARiz. REy. STAT. §§ 33-1301 to
1381 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 99 47a-1 to 47a-20 (West 1978); DEL. CODE tit, 25, §§
5101 to 6504 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. 99 83.40 to 83.63 (West Supp. 1978); Ky. RED. STAT.
ANN. §§ 383.505 to 383.715 (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1976); NEB. RED. STAT. §§ 76-1401 to 1449
(Cum. Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. §§ 70-7-1 to 70-7-51 (Supp. 1975); ORE. REa. STAT. §§ 91.700-
.865 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § §64-2801 to 64-2864 (Cum. Supp. 1976); VA. CODE § §55-248.2-
.40 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
URLTA has actually been adopted in a total of fifteen states, four of which had previously
implied the warranty judicially. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969), HAw.
REv. STAT. §§ 521-1 to 521-76 (1976) (adopted 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521
P.2d 304 (1974), KAN. STAT. §§ 58-2540 to 2573 (1976) (adopted 1975); Glyco v. Schultz, 62
Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1977), Omo Rza. CODE ANN. §§ 5321.01-.19 (Page Supp.
1976) (adopted 1974); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973), WAsH. Rav. CODE
ANN. §§ 59.18.010-.900 (Supp. 1977) (adopted 1975, some rewording).
Two of these states adopted only the URLTA provision for a general warranty of habitabil-
ity, "A landlord shall make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the
premises in a fit and habitable condition" (general warranty). See UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AN TENANT ACr, § 2.104(a)(2); ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1975); ORE. REy. STAT.
§ 91.770 (1) (1974). Nine states adopted both this general warranty and the URLTA warranty
based upon existing codes. "A landlord [shall] ... comply with the requirements of applica-
ble building and housing codes materially affecting health and safety" (code-based war-
ranty). See UNIFORM REsmIENTiAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT, § 2.104 (a)(1); ARiz. Rav. STAT.
§ 33-1324 (A)(1)(2) (1974) (reference to "housing code" omitted remains "building code");
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5303 (a)(1)(2) (1975) (slight
rewording); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.51 (1)(a)(b)(2)(a) (West Supp. 1978) (substantial modifica-
tion of the above provisions provides minimum standards for housing not covered by a code);
Ky. RE. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (a)(b) (Supp. 1976); NEE. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (a)(b) (Baldwin
Cum. Supp. 1974) (adds "substantially" comply to (1), adds written or actual notice require-
ment); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-20 (A)(1)(2) (Supp. 1975) (adds "substantially" comply to
(1) and substitutes "safe condition" for "fit and habitable"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2824
(a)(1)(2) (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.13 (a)(1)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
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relating to the condition of the property In' certain jurisdictions,
judicially implied warranties co-exist with [non-uniform] stat-
utes.8
To counteract this recent development in the law, many landlords
are currently presenting tenants with leases, usually standardized
forms, by which a tenant purports to waive rights and remedies or
hold the landlord harmless for the condition of the premises. This
article will explore the impact of leases containing such waiver pro-
visions and will set forth the rationale for declaring such provisions
unenforceable.'
EvOLUTION OF WARRANTIES
To support the proposition that a waiver of the implied warranty
of habitability should not be permitted and that the inclusion of
waiver provisions in standardized form leases should be penalized,
it is necessary to examine the traditional common law from which
the warranty evolved and the rationales of the courts which have
implied the warranty.
7. See notes 23-38 infra and accompanying text.
8. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974),
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1954); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184,
293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 8A (Cum. Ann. Supp. 1978-79);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-85 to 42-97
(West Cum. Ann. Supp. 1976); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 63 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11
(Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1971), N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-b (McKinney Cum. Ann. Supp. 1977-78);
Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wisc. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), Wis. STAT. ANN. § 704.07 (West
Supp. 1977).
9. The implied warranty of habitability has been the subject of numerous publications
in law journals. Most have primarily focused on a recitation of the rationales articulated by
the courts in creating the warranty. See, e.g., Abbott, Housing Policy, Housing Codes and
Tenant Remedies: an Integration, 56 B.U.L. REv. 1 (1976); Meyers, Covenant of Habitability
and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REv. 879 (1975); Line, Implied Warranties of
Habitability and Fitness for Intended Use in Urban Residential Leases, 26 BAYLOR L. REv.
161 (1974); Moskovitz, Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New
Issues, 62 CAuF. L. Rev. 1444 (1974); Special Project: Developments in Contemporary
Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REv. 689 (1973); Modern
Status of Rules as to Existence of Implied Warranty of Habitability or Fitness for Use of
Leased Premises, 40 A.L.R. 3d 646 (1971).
By comparison, little has been written within these articles on the issue of a waiver of
landlord's duty. See generally Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habit-
ability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 729, 768-9 (1976); Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective
Premises: Caveat Lessee, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 75 Wis. L. REv. 19, 106-7 (1975);
Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REv. 879,
881 (1975); Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine Raising New
Issues, 62 CALIF. L. Rev. 1444, 1448 (1974); Comment, Tenant Protection in Iowa, 58 IowA L.
REv. 656, 673-83 (1973). The only publication which dealt specifically with the issue of waiver
was an analysis of the one case in which waiver was litigated. Note, Waiving the Implied
Warranty of Habitability in Residential Leases, 53 NEB. L. Rev. 610 (1974).
Warranty of Habitability
The Common Law
Due to the independent covenants rule, 0 applied to the landlord-
tenant relationship along with caveat emptor, the tenant's rent be-
came due once the landlord delivered possession. The obligation to
pay rent was excused only if the landlord interfered with possession
causing an eviction of the tenant." The tenant was not relieved of
his rental obligation even if the landlord breached an express prom-
ise to repair the premises. 2 Improvements on the premises were
considered incidental to the land, which was the subject matter of
the lease." Carried to its logical extreme, the tenant's obligation for
rent continued even if the improvements were totally destroyed.'4
The practical effect of applying caveat emptor and the indepen-
dent covenants rule was that the tenant could choose to rent less
than desirable dwellings, setting personal standards of acceptabil-
ity. The law provided for the exceptional situations so that if there
were latent defects undiscoverable by the tenant upon an inspec-
tion" or if the tenant were renting a furnished dwelling for a short
term without the time or opportunity for an adequate inspection, a
limited duty was placed on the landlord to disclose the existence of
known defects. The remedy offered to the tenant was to terminate
the lease.'"
In an agricultural environment where land and not housing was
the primary bargain of the parties, where housing was of very simple
construction so that the tenant was generally capable of repair if
choosing to do so, and where there was no shortage of housing, these
rules seldom injured the tenant. 7 The common law doctrine of
caveat emptor, however, has an adverse effect upon today's tenant.
The tenant is now primarily interested in renting a dwelling rather
10. Under the rule that covenants were independent, the duty of immediate performance
was not dependent on performance by the other party to the lease. Therefore, failure of one
to perform did not excuse performance by the other. All promises by landlord and tenant were
secondary to the landlord tenant relationship. Breach of a secondary undertaking did not
terminate the estate but gave rise to a cause of action for damages only. 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See Barry v. Frankini, 287 Mass. 196, 191 N.E. 651,
93 A.L.R. 1240 (1934).
11. 1 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
12. Stone v. Sullivan, 300 Mass. 450, 15 N.E.2d 476, 116 A.L.R. 1223 (1938); 6S. WILUS-
TON, A TREATisE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890 (3d ed. 1962).
13. 2 F. POLLACK AND F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLSH LAW, 131 (2d ed. 1959).
14. Fowler v. Bott, 6 Mass. 63 (1809); Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K. B. 1947).
15. Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902); RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 358 (1965).
16. See generally Carusi v. Schulmerick, 98 F.2d 605, 607 (D. C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 645 (1938); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693 (1843).
17. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp. 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970).
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than land. Generally, the tenant does not possess the skills neces-
sary to assume repairs nor does he have the capability of repairing
or the long term interest in the property necessary for financing.
Moreover, many defects require repair work that extends beyond his
right of possession in the demised premises.' 8
Judicially Implied Warranties: The Courts Answer To Unenforced
Housing Codes
The first attempt to remedy this situation was the enactment of
statutes which enabled local units of government to establish hous-
ing codes regulating the condition of dwellings.' The enforcement
of these elaborately detailed provisions was delegated to public au-
thorities. 20 However, official enforcement proved inadequate. Illus-
trative of the problem are the facts of a New York case in which the
bulk of the code violations which had been in existence for more
than four years were still not repaired by the landlord despite re-
peated court proceedings initiated by the enforcement agency.2' If
18. Id. at 1078; Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 624-25, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173, 111
Cal. Rptr. 704, 709 (1974).
19. "By 1910, over one fourth of the states had adopted housing codes ... covering urban
multifamily dwellings." Blumberg and Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program for Achieving
Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS Civ.-Lm. L. REv., at 5 (1976).
The past half century has brought the widespread enactment of comprehensive housing
codes throughout the nation. In California, the Department of Housing and Community
Development has established detailed, statewide housing regulations (see CAL. HEALTH AND
SAIuxr CODE, §§ 17920-21; CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 25, §§ 1000-1090), and the Legislature has
expressly authorized local entities to impose even more stringent regulations. (See CAL.
HmTH AN SAFETY CODE, § 17951.) Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d
1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974).
20. The duties imposed by the Housing Regulations .. . [were] established by
the Commissioners because, in their judgment, the grave conditions in the housing
market required serious action. Yet official enforcement of the housing code has
been far from uniformly effective. Innumerable studies have documented the dis-
parate condition of rental housing in the District of Columbia and in the Nation.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970). See also Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies,
66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1254 (1966); Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HARv. L.
Rav. 801 (1965); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 191-92, 293 N.E.2d at
839 (1973). See also the lively debate concerning the effect of housing code enforcement on
the supply of low-cost housing stock in Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Codes on Behalf
of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE
L.J. 1093 (1971). Komesar, Return to Slumville: A Critique of the Ackerman Analysis of
Housing Code Enforcement and the Poor, 82 YALE L.J. 1175 (1973). But see Ackerman, More
on Slum Housing and Redistribution Policy: A Reply to Professor Komesar, 82 YALE L.J. 1194
(1973). For an empirical analysis of this debate see Hirsch, Hirsch and Margolis, Regression
Analysis of the Effects of Habitability Laws Upon Rent: An Empirical Observation on the
Ackerman-Komesar Debate, 63 CALiF. L. Rav. 1098 (1975).
21. Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 19, 20, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 17 (Cir. Ct. N.Y.
1971).
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public enforcement had been effective there would have been no
need for the implied warranty of habitability.
The warranty is another attempt to establish minimum housing
conditions. It is a judicial means of providing a tenant with private
enforcement of the provisions of housing codes which have already
shifted the primary duty for habitable dwelling units to the land-
lord." An implied warranty of habitability has been recognized by
a growing number of courts in the last few years. Under this war-
ranty, the duty has been imposed upon the landlord to deliver prem-
ises in a habitable condition,2 or to maintain the premises in a
condition fit for habitation." In some jurisdictions, the duty has
been implied as to both delivery and maintenance."
22. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 193, 293 N.W.2d 831, 839 (1973).
23. Fifteen jurisdictions have judicially implied a warranty of habitability. The trend
towards implied warranties of habitability can be traced back to 1961 when the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin decided Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). The
early Pines decision was followed by a gap in years and then Hawaii and New Jersey implied
the warranty of habitability prior to Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). See Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470
(1969) and Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
Most of the cases which have implied a warranty of habitability, however, were decided
after the landmark case of Javins. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P;2d 1168,
111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972);
Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 346
N.E.2d 404 (1977); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan.
329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831
(1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87,
276 A.2d 248 (1971); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S. 2d 11 (Cir. Ct.
N.Y. 1971). Amanuensis was authority for the New York City Courts only until the state
legislature made a statutory warranty applicable statewide. N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 235-b
(McKinney Cum. Ann. Supp. 1977-78); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d
919 (1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
The Javins case, in recognizing the lack of suitable housing for low income tenants, dis-
cussed the inability of modern tenants to assume the ownership responsibilities of their
agrarian predecessors, the lack of power they possess as against the landlords at the time of
signing the lease agreement and the inability of today's tenants to use the historical doctrine
of constructive eviction as a remedy to living in uninhabitable conditions. See text accompa-
nying footnotes 41-50, infra. In response to this dilemma, the court held that a warranty of
habitability is implied into all leases by operation of law and that the warranty is measured
by the standards set out in the Housing Regulations. 428 F.2d at 1071-72. By basing the
breach of this warranty on existing housing codes, the court provided a minimum standard
for the condition of the premises of residential tenants. It further provided the same tenants
the remedy of privately enforcing the provisions of the code.
24. Although the habitable condition of premises has not been clearly defined, the court
in Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 338, 521 P.2d 304, 311 (1974) has stated: "Not every defect
or inconvenience should be deemed to constitute a breach of covenant of habitability; the
condition complained of should be such as truly renders the premises uninhabitable in the
eyes of a reasonable person."
25. Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 3d
22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
26. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974);
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Courts have developed two identifiable classes of implied warran-
ties. The first is based upon the provisions of applicable housing
codes ("code-based warranty").27 Other courts have implied a more
general warranty.2 A general warranty is usually stated as a war-
ranty by the landlord that at the inception of the rental there are
no latent or patent defects in facilities vital to the use of the prem-
ises for residential purposes and that these essential facilities will
remain during the entire term in a condition which makes property
livable.29 This general warranty has been devised for the stated pur-
Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 111. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 209 (1972); Old Town Dev. Co. v.
Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977); Mease
v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293
N.E.2d 831 (1973); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Bums, 111
N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Glyco v.
Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972).
27. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal.
Rptr., 704, 719 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217
(1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 335, 521 P.2d 304, 309 (1974); King v. Moorehead,
495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo. App. 1973); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15, 318 N.Y.S.2d
11, 19 (Cir. Ct. N.Y. 1971); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 463, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925
(1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 29,515 P.2d 160, 165 (1973). See Dapkunas v. Cagle,
42 Ill. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976) for a decision which held there was no implied
warranty because there was no code. See also Groll, Property, Spring v. Little: Landlord-
Tenant Law Approaches the Twentieth Century, 22 DEPAuL L. R v. 51 (1972).
28. The general warranty is at this time an undefined term. Its purpose, both statutorily
and judicially, seems to be to preserve the right of the courts to imply the warranty should
there be uninhabitable conditions not covered by a code or to provide protection for tenants
living in those geographical communities in which there is no code. Because the cases which
speak of a general warranty are actually fact situations which could have been decided on a
code based warranty an analysis of the language of these cases indicates that there is nothing
that requires a general warranty. See Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199,
293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 ll. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
See also Dapkunas v. Cagle, 42 Il. App. 3d 644, 356 N.E.2d 575 (1976) in which the court
held there was no implied warranty because there was no code on which to base the implied
duty. It is submitted the general warranty should not be a means to require some undefined
duty on the part of the landlord to provide habitable conditions in addition to existing code
requirements.
But see, Millbridge Apartments v. Linden, 151 N.J. Super. 168, 376 A.2d 611 (1967) where
the court clearly stated that in addition to code violations a criterion for establishing a breach
of the implied warranty of habitability would be be to inquire if "the condition is one to which
the tenant should reasonably be expected to accommodate as part of everyday living in an
area populated as the premises in question." Id. at 172-73, 376 A.2d at 614. The court
emphasized that a tenant in a garden type apartment complex should not be expected to
tolerate repeated loud noise as an ordinary living condition and held that such noise may
constitute a constructive eviction. The court went on to state that if a condition is substantial
enough to constitute a constructive eviction, it may also be a breach of habitability. Id. See
also Park Hill Terrace Assoc. v. Glennon, 146 N.J. Super. 271, 369 A.2d 938 (1977) (evi-
dence supported finding that air conditioning failure for stated days affected habitability of
the involved premises).
29. See Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744, 764 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal
dismissed, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 144, 265 A.2d 526, 534 (1970).
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pose that the protection afforded by the code-based warranty does
not necessarily coincide with housing code requirements and that
there may be instances where conditions not covered by code regula-
tions render the apartment uninhabitable. 3
Where breach is determined on the basis of violations of a housing
code, minor violations have been held not to constitute breach.', In
either case, the landlord has not breached the general or code-based
warranties where defects are caused by any act of the tenant.31 Once
breach has been determined, the tenant has been allowed to termi-
nate the lease 3 and sue for damages.3' Because the traditional rem-
edy of termination does not necessarily result in putting the prem-
ises in a habitable condition,35 courts have also devised various rem-
30. Two courts have implied both the general warranty and the code based warranty.
Under these circumstances we hold the landlord impliedly warrants at the outset
of the lease that there are not latent defects in facilities and utilities vital to the
use of the premises for residential purposes and that these essential features shall
remain during the entire term in such condition to maintain the habitability of the
dwelling. Further, the implied warranty we perceive in the lease situation is a
representation there neither is nor shall be during the term a violation of applicable
housing law, ordinance or regulation which shall render the premises unsafe, or
unsanitary and unfit for living therein.
Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972). See also Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway,
363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973).
31. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 638, 517 P.2d 1168, 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 719 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); King v.
Moorhead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973). See also Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111
N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970) where the court stated:
Tenant asserts that [the warranty of habitability] was broken because landlord
failed to supply heat and water service to a ninth-story apartment; the inciner-
ator did not function, impairing garbage disposal; the hot water supply failed;
water leaked into the bathroom, there were defects in venetian blinds; the plaster
in the walls was cracked, and the apartment was unpainted. Some of these clearly
go to bare living requirements. In a modem society one cannot be expected to live
in a multi-storied apartment building without heat, hot water, garbage disposal or
elevator service. Failure to supply such things is a breach of the implied covenant
of habitability. Malfunction of venetian blinds, water leaks, wall cracks, lack of
painting, at least of the magnitude presented here, go to what may be called 'ameni-
ties.' Living with lack of painting, water leaks and defective venetian blinds may
be unpleasant, aesthetically unsatisfying, but does not come within the category
of uninhabitability.
Id. at 482-83, 268 A.2d at 559.
32. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); Kline v.
Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
33. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
34. Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
35. The implied warranty of habitability remedy developed, in measure, as
response to a chronic and prolonged housing shortage, particularly for those of low
income . . . . Common law constructive eviction, (based upon a fiction which the
implied warranty remedy discards) could be claimed only by a tenant who aban-
doned the premises within a reasonable time. Abandonment was required to main-
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edies which permit raising the conditions of the premises and at the
same time not forcing the tenant to vacate. Tenants have been
permitted to repair the defect and deduct the cost from future rental
payments36 and to withhold rental payments alleging the breach as
a defense to a suit by the landlord for possession or past rentY The
courts, however, have not accepted the concept that breach of the
warranty causes rent to abate totally and thus a measurable value
has been attached to the use of the premises in the defective condi-
tion3 and has been assessed against the tenant.
The Courts' Rationale
In addition to the changes in the factual setting of the landlord-
tenant relationship, courts have cited a series of rationales for
implying the warranty.39 Underlying all of these rationales is the
objective of providing minimum housing standards and the fact that
tain the fiction of an eviction and thus the breach of the dependent covenant of
quiet enjoyment. The effect of the abandonment requirement was to prevent a
tenant from remaining in possession without paying rent. . .. Constructive evic-
tion has proved an insufficient remedy for those most likely to have resorted to it,
low income tenants. The dilemma it raises for them is that they must continue to
pay rent and endure the conditions of untenantability or abandon the premises and
hope to find another dwelling which in these times of severe housing shortage, is
likely to be as uninhabitable as the last.
King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 76-77 (Mo. App. 1973). Recognition of an implied war-
ranty of habitability makes available to the tenant the basic contract remedies of damages,
reformation and recision. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972).
36. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
37. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 507 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974); Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Boston Hous. Auth. v. Heming-
way, 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973).
38. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H.
87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556
(1970); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 83
Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
These enormous factual changes in the landlord-tenant field have been paralleled
by equally dramatic changes in the prevailing legal doctrines governing commercial
transactions. Whereas the traditional common law 'no duty to maintain or repair'
rule was steeped in the caveat emptor ethic of an earlier commercial era . . .
modern legal decisions have recognized that the consumer in an industrial society
should be entitled to rely on the skill of the supplier to assure that goods and
services are of adequate quality. In seeking to protect the reasonable expectation
of consumers, judicial decisions, discarding the caveat emptor approach, have for
some time implied a warranty of fitness and merchantability in the case of the sale
of goods . . . . In recent years, moreover, California courts have increasingly recog-
nized the applicability of this implied warranty theory to real estate transactions;
prior cases have found a warranty of fitness implied by law with respect to the
construction of new housing units. ...
Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 626-27, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 710
(1974).
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the tenant, left on his own, is unable within the framework of com-
mon law principles to bargain for habitable housing. 0
In contrast to the situation at common law where the parties to a
lease were in an equal bargaining position," today's tenants have
little bargaining power. 2 This lack of bargaining power affects the
tenant both prior to the signing of the lease and after the lease term
has begun. An inspection today may prove to be a useless task for
the tenant who is often not capable of discovering defects in com-
plex wiring, plumbing, heating and electrical systems. 3 If uninha-
bitable conditions are discovered and the tenant is not capable of
performing repairs, he cannot bargain for a lower rental in exchange
for making the repairs himself." In this respect, today's tenant
stands in sharp contrast to his agrarian predecessor. The logical
choice then is to bargain for the landlord to expressly covenant to
repair or to look elsewhere. Given today's housing shortage, 5 the
tenant generally has no leverage to extract a covenant to repair from
the landlord. There are alternate premises, but all are likely to be
in a similar state of dilapidation .
4
40. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
Although tenants as a class are not able to secure habitable housing conditions without the
implication of a warranty of habitability, it is within the realm of possibility that an individ-
ual tenant may have the bargaining power to place himself beyond the need of this protection.
It is possible that the burden of proof may establish that a particular tenant has in fact the
capacity to bargain equally with his landlord. Also, there might be circumstances where there
is clear and convincing evidence that the tenant does have the financial capability to assume
repairs and/or the physical capability to cure defects especially when the repair needed can
be accomplished entirely within the demised premises. When the financial and physical
capabilities are joined with the requisite meeting of minds to ensure that the tenant know-
ingly waives landlord's duty, then through the application of standard contract principles the
tenant could waive an otherwise legally enforceable right without destroying the objective of
the warranty.
However, this is not the thrust of landlord-tenant law. Nor is this the tenant that the
implied warranty was created to protect. Although within the framework of legal analysis,
the principle of freedom of contract remains inviolate, courts must infringe upon it where it
does not operate effectively. It does not operate effectively in the majority of landlord-tenant
cases.
41. See generally Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 144, 154 (Ind. App. 1976),
appeal dismissed, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977). Compare Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease:
Can Contract Law Provide the Answer?, 71 N.W.U.L. Rav. 204 (1976); Fort, Understanding
Unconscionability: Defining the Principle, 9 Loy. Cm. L.J. 765 (1978).
42. See Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Iowa 1972).
43. See Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford, 349 N.E.2d 744 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal dis-
missed, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977).
44. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 630, 517 P.2d 1168, 1176-77, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 713 (1974).
45. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
46. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr.
704, 709-10 (1974).
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The tenant also lacks the bargaining power necessary to force
the landlord to maintain habitable premises once possession has
been taken. Under common law principles, the doctrine of construc-
tive eviction was the sole remedy in the absence of an express
covenant to repair." This remedy permitted the tenant to termi-
nate the lease in very limited circumstances. Conduct by the land-
lord which had the effect of depriving the tenant of the beneficial
use of the demised premises permitted the tenant, after notice, to
abandon if he did so within a reasonable length of time thereby
ending his obligation to pay the remaining rental. By recognizing
that the landlord could make the tenant's position so untenable
that he would be forced to abandon the premises, the common law
provided the tenant with the same remedy as for actual eviction."s
Because the doctrine was based on a breach of landlord's limited
duties, and because of the difficulty in proving that the tenant was
justified in abandoning and had done so within a reasonable time,
the doctrine has been applicable in limited circumstances." Even
if the limited doctrine of constructive eviction were expanded to
impose greater duties on today's landlord, more often than not
there are no alternative places to rent to fulfill the doctrine's re-
quirement of abandonment. 0
The comprehensive housing codes which have been enacted in the
47. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.47 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
48. Id. at § 3.51.
49. The original application of the doctrine of constructive eviction was in the famous case
of Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. 1826). In that case, parts of a building were rented
to tenants who used their holding for immoral purposes and created disturbances which
prevented defendant from sleeping. Accordingly, the defendant was permitted to introduce
evidence that he abandoned. The doctrine has been expanded but has been most significantly
applied in those cases involving breach of an express covenant or a statutory duty to repair
or to furnish heat or services. 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.51 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
50. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625, 517 P.2d 1168, 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704,
709-10 (1974); President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent Home (1968).
When various impediments to competition in the rental housing market, such as racial
discrimination, class discrimination, and standardized form leases are added to these difficul-
ties, it is obvious that landlords frequently place tenants in a take-it-or-leave-it situation.
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970). The effect of this change, from an agrarian to an urban setting and the lack of tenants'
bargaining power, is that many tenants are forced to live in far less than satisfactory condi-
tions. This is an undesirable situation for the individual tenants and also the general public.
See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412 (1961). Substandard housing
is detrimental to the whole of society, not merely the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily
indignity of living in a slum. Various studies establish the social impact of bad housing. A.
SCHOOR, SLUMS AND INSECURITY (1963). Compare MILLSPAUGH AND G. BREcKENILD, THE
HUMAN SIDE OF URBAN RENEWAL (1960). Slum housing has been considered at least a contrib-
uting cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency, and high property taxes
for conscientious landlords. See Pines v. Persion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N W.2d 409, 412,
413 (1961).
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past half century have expressly authorized local entities to impose
more stringent regulations on landlords. "The [y] . . .affirm that,
under contemporary conditions, public policy compels landlords to
bear the primary responsibility for maintaining safe, clean and hab-
itable housing . . . ."I' In addition to housing codes, legislative
rules, administrative rules, and health regulations all impose cer-
tain duties on a property owner with respect to condition of the
premises.2 Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgement that
it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a
property owner.53
This duty is imposed on the landlord because he is in the best
position to know the condition of the premises. Housing code re-
quirements and violations are usually made known to the landlord."
The tenant should not be expected to know if the plumbing and
wiring systems conform to local codes nor should the tenant be
expected to hire experts to advise him.55 The landlord has access to
equipment and areas totally within his control which in multi-unit
buildings are often crucial to adequate repair." It is the owner who
has become a party in the transaction for business purposes, and the
business risk falls to him. The landlord will retain ownership and
should bear the costs of repair.57
The process through which the implied warranty of habitability
accomplishes this purpose is twofold. First, by incorporating all
existing law relevant to leases (e.g., housing codes) into the contract
between landlord and tenant, the duty imposed on the landlord by
such codes becomes the duty imposed by the implied warranty. 8
51. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704,
711 (1974).
52. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
53. See Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
54. Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 92, 276 A.2d 249, 251 (1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J.
130, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970).
55. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970).
56. Id. at 1078.
57. Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 636, 517 P.2d 1168, 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704,
717 (1974).
58. Cf. Schiro v. Gould & Co., 18 Ill. 2d 538, 165 N.E.2d 286 (1960). In Schiro, plaintiff
had agreed to purchase certain real property on which defendants were to erect a house.
Plaintiffs tendered the amount due on the purchase price and requested that the court order
defendants to install a water and sewerage system in conformance with the Chicago Building
Code. Defendants moved to strike the complaint, as amended, arguing that it failed to state
a cause of action in that the contract contained no provision requiring that such a water and
sewer system be installed. The trial court allowed the motion and dismissed the suit. In
reversing the judgment the appellate court said:
It is settled law that all contracts for the purchase and sale of realty are presumed
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Second, through the doctrine of dependent covenants, the tenant
has the power to enforce the implied duty."
Simply, however, to imply compliance with those code provisions
into the landlord's obligations to the lease without changing the
tenant's remedies under the lease is to deny the tenant any realistic
private enforcement. The tenant must have a different remedy than
what was offered under common law. Only if contractual principles
to have been executed in the light of existing law, and with reference to the applica-
ble legal principles. . .. Thus, the law existing at the time and place of the making
of the contract is deemed a part of the contract, as though expressly referred to or
incorporated in it.
The rationale for this rule is that the parties to the contract would have ex-
pressed that which the law implies 'had they not supposed that it was unnecessary
to speak of it because the law provided for it' . . . . Consequently, the courts in
construing the existing law as part of the expressed contract, are not reading into
the contract provisions different from those expressed and intended by the parties,
as defendants contend, but are merely construing the contract in accordance with
the intent of the parties.
Applying this established law to the instant case, it is evident that the contract
to purchase the land and building to be constructed by defendants included, as an
integral part, the relevant provisions of the city code in existence at the time the
contract was executed. The requirements of that code were, therefore, as much a
part of the contract as if they had been enumerated by the parties.
Id. at 544-45, 165 N.E.2d at 290-91. See also Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 361,
280 N.E.2d 208, 214, 215 (1972).
59. At common law, the tenant could never justifiably withhold rent until the
landlord made repairs because his rental obligation was not dependant on any
services performed by the landlord besides delivery of the property to the tenant
. . . [Tihe Legislature in enacting the rent withholding provisions, have retreated
from the fundamental common law assumption on which the independent cove-
nants rule is based, namely, that a lease is primarily a conveyance of an interest in
real estate. By fixing a clear duty of repair on the landlord before the landlord can
recover withheld rent in those cases where the demised premises are in violation of
the standards of fitness for human habitation established under the State Sanitary
Code, the Massachusetts Legislature has further weakened the old common law
rule that the tenant's obligation to pay rent is totally independent of any obligation
the landlord may bear.
Boston Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 194, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (1973).
This legislative alteration of the most important incident of the common law
status of a lease as a property conveyance requires a judicial reappraisal of the
common law status itself because the Legislature's actions reflect a characterization
of the landlord-tenant relationship that radically differs from the status accorded
to it by the common law.
Our reexamination leads us to conclude that the exception to the independent
covenants rule carved out by the Ingalls case. . . in response to what was then an
unusual situation, must now become the rule in an urban industrial society where
the essential objective of the leasing transaction is to provide a dwelling suitable
for habitation. The old commonn law treatment of the lease as a property convey-
ance and the independent covenants rule which stems from this treatment have
outlived their usefulness.
Id. at 196-97, 293 N.E.2d at 841.
Warranty of Habitability
are applied to the landlord-tenant relationship will this be accom-
plished. The tenant's obligation to pay rent must be held to be
mutually dependent upon the landlord's duty to provide habitable
premises.10
THE ISSUE OF WAIVER
The Case Law: Conflicting Guidelines
The courts which have implied the warranty of habitability are
divided on the issue of whether or not to permit waiver. The issue
has actually been litigated in only one case, Foisy v. Wyman." In
that case, the landlord and tenant had agreed to a reduced rental
in exchange for premises which had a substantial number of defects.
The court stressed the fact that this type of bargaining by a landlord
with a tenant was contrary to public policy and to the purpose of
the implied warranty of habitability. 2 It pointed out that a "dis-
advantaged tenant should not be placed in a position of agreeing
to live in uninhabitable premises.""3 Moreover, it stated that unin-
habitable housing conditions were "a health hazard, not only to the
individual tenant but to the community which is exposed to the
individual." 4 Accordingly, the court held that in all contracts for
the renting of premises, oral or written, there is an implied warranty
of habitability and breach of this warranty constitutes a defense in
an unlawful detainer action. 5
Eight jurisdictions have never mentioned waiver.6 Those remain-
ing have commented on the issue in dicta, offering conflicting guide-
lines. 7 The first case to discuss waiver was the now famous case of
Javins v. First National Realty Corporation."6 In Javins, the court
60. Id. at 198, 293 N.E.2d at 842.
61. 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
62. Id. at 28, 515 P.2d at 164.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Old Town Dev. Co. v. Langford,
349 N.E.2d 774 (Ind. App. 1976), appeal dismissed, 369 N.E.2d 404 (1977); Steele v. Latimer,
214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973);
Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d
15, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (N.Y. Cir. Ct. 1971); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 289 N.E.2d
919 (1972); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
67. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1081-82, n.58 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 625 n.9, 517 P.2d 1168,
1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 709-10 (1974); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280
N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Boston Hous. Auth.
v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87,
93, 276 A.2d 248, 252 (1971).
68. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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voiced the opinion that duties specifically placed upon the lessor by
the Housing Regulations could not be waived or shifted by agree-
ment. Accordingly, the court stated that any private agreement to
shift duties imposed by the regulations would be illegal and unen-
forceable because such an agreement would nullify the object of the
statute."
In apparent contrast to the approach of the Javins court is that
of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Kline v. Burns,7° a case
decided just one year later. The Kline court commented that in
determining whether there has been a breach of the implied war-
ranty, one factor to be considered is whether the tenant waived the
defect.7
These cases are distinguishable, however, in that Kline implies a
general warranty not based on a Housing Code." The reference in
the decision to existing housing codes was only an acknowledgement
that the legislature recognized the need and desirability of insuring
adequate housing.73 Apparently the court was attempting to provide
a minimum standard in circumstances where the housing code was
not available or was not well drawn. But the court neither defined
the general warranty nor provided guidelines for permissible waiver.
Javins and Kline seemed to indicate that waiver would not be
permitted where a court implied a code-based warranty but would
be permitted for a general warranty. Nevertheless, following these
decisions, waiver was permitted in the Iowa case of Mease v. Fox7'
where the court implied both code-based and general warranties
without stating if waiver attached to only one.7" Standing alone,
Mease v. Fox would seem to confuse what would otherwise be two
distinct trends. Fortunately, it was followed by the case of Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway7l decided by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts. Boston Housing Authority was the first
case to imply both the code-based warranty and the general war-
ranty while clearly distinguishing the waiver issue as applicable to
the general warranty but not to the code-based warranty.77
69. Id. at 1082 n.58.
70. 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
71. Id. at 93, 276 A.2d at 252.
72. Id. Although the court cited Javins it was only for the principle that courts have a
duty to reappraise old doctrines in the light of the facts and values of contemporary life. Id.
at 91, 276 A.2d at 251.
73. Id.
74. 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972). "A factor in determining breach is whether or not tenant
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived the defects." Id. at 797.
75. Id.
76. 363 Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1972).
77. "This warranty (in so far as it is based on the State Sanitary Code and local health
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The Statutes: A State of Similar Confusion
There is a similar lack of consistency in the statutory material.
Although the jurisdictions adopting the URLTA provisions follow a
general pattern of permitting waiver of the general warranty" and
denying waiver of the code-based warranty," there are exceptions to
both. Tennessee and Virginia permit waiver of the landlord's duty
to comply with housing codes.8 0 Arizona, Connecticut and New
Mexico specifically prohibit waiver of the landlord's duty to put and
maintain premises in a habitable condition.8 ' Florida, Nebraska,
Ohio and Washington's versions of ULRTA do not specifically pro-
hibit waiver of the general warranty but contain the general provi-
sion that no rental provision! can specify that the tenant agrees to
waive or forego rights or remedies contained in the act. 2 Of the
remaining statutes implying a duty to the landlord, it is generally
permissible to waive"3 but this is not absolute.
The Non- Waiver of the Implied
Warranty of Habitability
The dissenting opinion in Boston Housing Authority pointed out
that despite use of words of a warranty that went beyond compli-
ance with codes, it was clear that relief in implied warranty cases
was based entirely on the existence of conditions which constitute
violations of codes. 5 A careful reading of each of the implied war-
regulations) cannot be waived by any provision in the lease or rental agreement." Id. at 199,
293 N.E.2d at 843.
78. ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100 (1975); DEL. CODE tit. 25, § 5303 (1975); HAW. REv. STAT. §
521-42 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 58-2553 (1976); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (Baldwin Cum.
Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2824 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.13 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
79. Amz. REv. STAT. § 33-1324 (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West 1978); DEL.
CODE tit. 25, § 5303 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.47 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); HAw. Rav. STAT.
§ 521-42 (1976); KAN. STAT. § 58-253 (1976); Ky. REy. STAT. ANN. § 383.595 (Baldwin Cum.
Supp. 1976); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-1419 (Cum. Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 70-7-20 (Supp.
1975); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (Page Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 59.18.23
(Supp. 1977).
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2824 (1976); VA. CODE § 55-248.13 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
81. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 33-1324 (1974); CONN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 47a-7 (West 1978); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 70-7-20 (Supp. 1975).
82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.47 (West Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. Rv. STAT. § 67-1415 (Cum.
Supp. 1974); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5321.13 (Page Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
59.18.230 (Supp. 1977).
83. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 41, § 31 (West 1954); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-18-16b (2) (1970) (if
the term of the lease is nine months or more); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 554.139 (2) (Supp.
1978-79) (if the term is at least one year).
84. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:42-96 (West Cum. Ann. Supp. 1978-79); N.Y. REAL PRop. LAW §
235-b 2. (McKinney Cum. Ann. Supp. 1977-78); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 43-32-8 (Supp.
1978).
85. 363 Mass. 184, 205-06, 293 N.E.2d 831, 846 (1973).
1978]
Loyola University Law Journal [Vol. 10
ranty cases substantiates this assertion. Like Boston Housing
Authority, those which speak in terms of a general warranty have
actually been factual situations in which the uninhabitable condi-
tions constituted violations of existing codes."8 In the cases decided
prior to Javins, the language is that of a general warranty but the
uninhabitable conditions were defects in plumbing, heating, electri-
cal systems and rat infestation.87 Although these courts did not spe-
cifically find these conditions to violate provisions of housing codes,
these are the very conditions which codes guard against. Thus, al-
though none of these cases were decided on the basis of violations
of certain housing code provisions, each of them could have been.
When viewed in the light of later cases which do not mention a
general warranty but specifically base their holdings on existing
codes, 8 a distinct trend towards recognition of only a code based
warranty is signified.
Because these codes are implied by law into all existing landlord-
tenant relationships the landlord's duty to meet the minimum stan-
dards set by codes cannot be waived. Where the implied warranty
of habitability is in fact based on housing codes, waiver clauses in
leases should be void and unenforceable. 9 To permit such private
86. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw.
426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Kline v. Bums,
111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
87. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 593, 111 N.W.2d 409, 411 (1961) (inadequate electri-
cal wiring, kitchen sink and toilet in disrepair, furnace in disrepair, handrail on stairs in
disrepair, screens on windows and doors lacking); Lemle v, Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 428, 462
P.2d 470, 472 (1969) (rates within main dwelling and on corrugated iron roof); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 134, 265 A.2d 526, 528 (1970) (toilet in leased apartment cracked, water
leaking on bathroom floor).
88. See Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 637-38, 517 P.2d 1168, 1182-83, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 704, 718-19 (1974) where the court stated:
This implied warranty of habitability does not require that a landlord ensure that
leased premises are in perfect, aesthetically pleasing condition, but it does mean
that bare living requirements must be maintained. In most cases substantial com-
pliance with those applicable building and housing code standards which materi-
ally affect health and safety will suffice to meet the landlord's obligations under
the common law implied warranty of habitability we now recognize.
Although the opinion may be interpreted as providing a general and a code-based warranty,
the concern that minor code violations would not be sufficient to constitute breach seems to
be the object of the language of the opinion. See also King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 79
(Mo. App. 1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 62 Ohio Op. 2d 459, 464, 289 N.E.2d 919, 926 (1972); Foisy
v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 32, 515 P.2d 160, 166 (1973). Compare South Austin Realty Ass'n
v. Sombright, 47 Ill. App. 3d 29, 361 N.E.2d 795 (1977) (code based warranty may not be
waived by clause in lease).
89. Mandatory minimum standards for housing units as prescribed by statutes, ordi-
nances, rules, regulations or codes, having the force and effect of law, cannot be waived or
otherwise undercut by agreement of the parties. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071, 1082 n.58 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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agreements would frustrate public policy and nullify the object of
the statute. 0
It is not enough, however, to declare waiver clauses unenforcea-
ble. As long as the issue is unlitigated landlords will attempt to
negate the impact of the implied warranty of habitability by includ-
ing waiver clauses in form leases." Even where waiver clauses may
be prohibited, if the landlord inserts an invalid clause into the lease
the unknowing tenant may not enforce his rights and will remain
in potentially dilapidated housing. In a recent survey, one landlord's
attorney admitted writing legally unenforceable provisions into
rental agreements in an attempt to deceive the tenants." When a
waiver of the implied warranty with respect to the condition of the
premises is coupled with a waiver of dependent convenants the ten-
ant has effectively agreed to eliminate all the judicial protection
which has been given. 3
Definite preventive steps are necessary to preclude landlords from
presenting standardized form leases containing waiver provisions.
One means of accomplishing that is found in the Uniform Residen-
tial Landlord Tenant Act. The Act provides that if a landlord de-
liberately uses a rental agreement containing provisions known by
him to be prohibited (e.g., confession of judgment clause, agree-
ment to pay landlord's attorneys fees or agreement to exulpate or
limit liability of landlord arising under law, etc.), the tenant may
recover in addition to his actual damages an amount up to three
months periodic rent and reasonable attorney fees. 4 Otherwise,
with a few lines of black print the author of a standardized lease
form washes away the innovation of judicial decisions and/or the
work and desires of legislatures.
90. "This warranty (in so far as it is based on the State Sanitary Code and local health
regulations) cannot be waived by any provision in the lease or rental agreement." Boston
Hous. Auth. v. Hemingway, 363 Mass. 184, 199, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (1973).
91. "Unless the courts insist that private agreements to shift the duties are illegal and
unenforceable, much of the impact of Javins and its progeny will go down the drain since
waiver of the implied covenant will rapidly become a stock clause in every landlord's lease."
J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 209 (2d ed. 1975). See text accompanying
note 9, supra.
92. Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Practice, 28
STAN. L. REV. 729, 769 n.198 (1976).
93. Any waiver of the dependency of covenants waives tenants' remedies.
Tenant's waiver: Tenant's covenant to pay rent is and shall be independent of each
and every other covenant of this Lease.
Tenant agrees that Tenant's damages for Lessor's breach shall in no case be de-
ducted from rent nor set off for purposes of determining whether any rent is due in
a forcible detainer action brought on the basis of unpaid rent.
Chicago Real Estate Board, Apartment Lease No. 15 § 24 (1974).
94. URLTA, 7 UNIFORM LAw ANNOTATED, Business and Financial Laws § 1.403(b), (Supp.
1976).
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CONCLUSION
The implied warranty of habitability may only turn out to be a
remedy for an interim period of time. We may discover that it, too,
will not fully achieve habitable housing.9" However, since the courts
and legislatures have established that the implication of a warranty
of habitability is the best available method of providing tenants
with habitable housing conditions and waiver is likely to destroy
that desired result, it must not be permitted.
The present lack of guidelines regarding waiver affects both land-
lords and tenants. In all jurisdictions but those few where the issue
has been litigated or dicta clearly indicates the outcome, the parties
do not know whether their own agreement on the issue would be
upheld and if so under what circumstances.
The value of standardized acceptable housing is so great that the
law should place upon the landlord the duty to provide habitable
housing regardless of the circumstances. By adopting that standard,
all that is forfeited by forbidding waiver is the freedom of contract
on the part of a particular class of tenants" which is very small in
number. The benefit of a nonwaivable implied warranty of habita-
bility to the large class of tenants in need of protection far outweighs
the interest of law in contractual freedom.
95. As Charles J. Meyers so descriptively points out:
ITihe Property Restatement proposes landlord and tenant rules that are likely to
involve the courts in costly and time consuming litigation . . . likely to injure the
interests of tenants by pricing them out of some housing and causing the abandon-
ment of other housing; and likely to transfer wealth from some landlords to their
tenants although the landlords themselves may be as victimized by present housing
policies as the tenants.
Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. Rav. 879,
903 (1975). Writers have also expressed the concern that an evaluation of the present
landlord-tenant relationship shows the need for a complete transformation from private and
public landlords to mutual ownership. See CRIBBET, supra note 91 at 238. Rather than mak-
ing the assumption that private ownership of housing is doomed to total collapse or that the
implied warranty is the certain remedy to the plight of the low income tenant, it is necessary
to view the warranty as an important step in the process of providing minimally safe housing.
Therefore, if the implied warranty, in fact, does not provide a sufficient framework within
which to provide habitable housing conditions, a more adequate remedy will have to be
fashioned. However, if implied warranty doctrine is effective, it will still be necessary to prune
it for its most effective application.
96. See note 40, supra.
